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Comments on Certain Proposed Amendments

to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code*
Charles M. Levenberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the nine years since the promulgation of the 1962 version
of the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9, dealing with secured
transactions in personal property, has probably been the most
criticized and the least uniform' of the Code's 10 articles. This is
probably because that Article, more than any other, has been
woven mostly from new threads, thereby creating many new
terms of art. The criticism surrounding Article 9 led to the appointment of a Review Committee in 1966 to study the Article in
depth and recommend amendments. The Committee published
its proposed amendments on February 1, 1970 in its Preliminary
Draft No. 2,2 and revised those proposals in a Final Report published April 25, 1971.3 The Committee has recommended amendments in 12 areas of Article 9: filing problems, default, conflict of
laws, scope questions, motor vehicles and related perfection problems, oil, gas and minerals, crops and farm products, timber,
fixtures, intangibles, proceeds and priorities.
This article will treat only the first four subjects-filing
problems, default, conflict of laws and scope questions. The author has sought to include those areas relevant to a large number
* The author wishes to thank Professor Vern Countryman of the

Harvard Law School whose encouragement and thoughtful criticism

made this article possible. However, the views expressed in this paper

are those of the author, and any faults therein are attributable solely
to him.

** Mr. Levenberg is associated with the firm of Oppenheimer,
Brown, Wolff, Leach &Foster, St. Paul, Minnesota.
1. The Permanent Editorial Board of the UNIFoRM CoMM .CIAL
CODE reported that as of 1966, 47 of the 54 sections of Article 9 had

been nonuniformly amended. PER
EDrroRAL. BOARD OF THE
UNIFORMW CoMMEnRcrI.L CODE, REPoRT No. 3 at x (1966).
[Hereinafter,

the UNIORmv ContvwEciAL CODE will be cited as UCC.]
CIAL

2. REvixw CoMnITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF TaE UNIFoRM CoilimmCODE, PRE nmwARY DRArT No. 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PaR-

un=IARY DRA T No. 2].

9 OF r UNIFORM Co.mm(1971) [hereinafter cited as FINAL RPOaRT].
All references in the text to "proposed" revisions, unless otherwise in3.

REvrsw CoMnITTEE FOR tTicrx

CIAL CODE,

FINAL

REPORT

dicated, refer to the

F±NAL REPORT.

the present version of the UCC.

All other textual references are to
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of secured transactions rather than those relating only to secured
transactions involving certain kinds of collateral. Thus the proposed amendments dealing with timber, motor vehicles, crops,
farm products, oil, gas and minerals were excluded. The subjects
of priorities, proceeds, intangibles and fixtures, while applicable
to many secured transactions, have been excluded because they
seemed glamorous enough to the commentators to have evoked a
healthy amount of literature which has discerned most of the
problems addressed by the Review Committee and anticipated a
good number of the Committee's proposed solutions. 4 The topics discussed in this article have not received the benefit of such
attention even though they are relevant to many secured transactions.
II. FILING PROCEDURES
Although the Committee has suggested some substantive
changes in the area of filing procedures, the bulk of its proposed
amendments attempt to clarify ambiguities in the present filing
provisions.

A.

FIxTUE FILINGS
The present Code provision on the filing of financing state-

4. The following articles are representative of the literature dealing with issues involving priorities: Coogan & Gordon, The Effect of
the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Receivables Financing-Some Answers and Some Unresolved Problems, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1529 (1963);
Folsenfeld, Knowledge as a Factor in Determining Prioritiesunder the
Uniform Commercial Code, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 246 (1967); Meek, Secured
Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 18 ARK. L. REV. 30
(1964); Smith, Article Nine: Secured Transactions-Perfectionand Priorities, 44 N. CAR. L. REV. 753 (1966). For discussions of issues involving
proceeds, see Gillombardo, The Treatment of Uniform Commercial Code
Proceeds in Bankruptcy-Proposed Redraft of Section 9-306, 38 U. CiN.
L. REV. 1 (1969); Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
232 (1965); Kennedy, Secured Interests in the Proceeds of Sale of Collateral,14 RUTGERS L. REV. 531 (1960). For general discussions of intangibles, see Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral Under the Code, 77 HRv. L.
REV. 997 (1964); Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security, 74 YALE L.J. 217 (1964); Kripke, Classification of and
Filings as to Intangibles, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 687 (1966).
For discussions
of fixtures, see Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 1319 (1962); Coogan, Uniformity in Fixtures, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1186 (1965); Drier, The Uniform
Commercial Code and the Law of Fixtures, 86 N.J.L.J. 61 (1963); Hanson, Fixtures: Commentary on Proposed Changes in Article 9, 52 MARQ.
L. REV. 179 (1969); Kennedy, Security Interests in Fixtures, 14 RUTGERS
L. REV. 536 (1960); Comment, Proposed Section 9-103: The Road to
Mandalay, 32 U. PITT. L. REV. 47 (1970).
5. UCC §§ 9-401 to 9-407.
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ments within a given state, Section 9-401(1), gives each state three
alternative approaches from which to select. Under each approach the number of filings required and the offices where they
are to be made turn upon the type or nature of the collateral.6
However, where the collateral is "goods which at the time the
security interest attaches are or are to become fixtures," all three
alternate forms of Section 9-401 (1) require that a single filing be
made in the "office where a mortgage on the real estate would be
filed or recorded." 7 The Committee does not propose to alter
this rule. It does, however, create a new term-"fixture filing'which is defined as
the filing in the office where a mortgage on the real estate
would be filed or recorded of a financing statement covering
goods which are or are to become fixtures and which conforms
to the requirements of subsection (5) and Section 9-402.8

Proposed Section 9-402(5) provides that a financing statement
filed as a fixture filing (where the debtor is not a "transmitting

utility")
must show that it covers this type of collateral, must recite that
it is to be filed [for record) in the real estate records, and the financing statement must contain a description of the real estate
[sufficient if it were contained in a mortgage of the real estate
to give9 constructive notice of the mortgage under the law of this
state].

The Committee explains that its creation and definition of the
term "fixture filing" and its requirements regarding the content
of financing statements covering such filings are designed
to emphasize a point that was intended but not clearly set forth
in the existing Code-that when a filing is intended to give [a
security interest in fixtures] priority advantages... against real
estate interests, the filing must be for record in the real estate
records and indexed therein, so that it will be found in a real
estate search ....

1o

No doubt it was this same intention which caused the drafters of
the current three alternative forms of Section 9-401 (1) to require
all financing statements for security interests in fixtures to be
6. UCC § 9-401(1) is perhaps the least uniform section of Article 9; the three alternative filing systems envisioned by the drafters
have become in reality a host of varying filing rules.
7. As note 6 supra suggests, there are several non-uniform provisions regarding the manner of filing for security interests in fixtures. California, for example, requires fixture filings to be made in
the office of the Secretary of State. CAL. COnvM. CODE § 9401 (West
Supp. 1971).
8. FiNAL REPORT, supra note 3, at § 9-313 (1) (b).
9.

Bracketed language is optional
DvaNARY
DRAFT No. 2, supranote 2, at 10.

10. PR
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filed in the office where a mortgage on the real estate would be
filed or recorded.
As previously mentioned, the Committee's proposal does
not change this general rule, but it does provide an exception
in the case of "transmitting utilities," which are defined as
any person primarily engaged in the railroad, street railway or
trolly bus business, the electric or electronics communications
transmission business, the transmission or the production and
transmission of electricity, steam, gas or water, or the provision
of sewer service."
Under proposed Section 9-401(5) a secured party taking a security
interest in the fixtures or any other collateral of a "transmitting
utility" would make its filing in the office of the Secretary of
State rather than in the offices where mortgages on the real estate would be filed or recorded. The Committee explains this
exception as resting on the fact that "transmitting utilities" often
have property throughout the state and this property is often
encumbered with combined real estate and chattel indentures.
This filing exception allows the secured party to avoid the onerous requirement of Section 9-401 (1) of filing in each county where
fixtures are located. However, only in jurisdictions which have
central (rather than county) filing requirements for real estate
mortgages will this exception achieve its purpose of eliminating
multiple county filings for security interests in the fixtures of
transmitting utilities. If the jurisdiction requires local county
filings for real estate mortgages, a secured party under a combined real estate and chattel indenture granted by a transmitting
utility still must file copies of the indenture in every county
where the utility has real estate, notwithstanding the Committee's proposed exception to the local fixture filing requirement
of Article 9. The Committee should therefore recommend that
enacting jurisdictions change from local to central real estate
mortgage filing, at least in the case of transmitting utilities.
One might ask if the Committee would have been wise to
make the new exception a general rule and eliminate local real
estate filings entirely for all security interests in fixtures. The
wisdom of such a suggestion turns upon the extent to which
debtors in fact have fixtures in several counties and the degree
to which central fixture filings would impede the purpose of local
filings-i.e., to place the existence of the security interest in fixtures upon the real estate record and thereby give notice to prospective purchasers and mortgagees of the realty. Once it were
11.

FrNAL REPORT, supra note 3, at § 9-105 (1) (n).
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known that all security interests in fixtures are recorded at the
office of the Secretary of State, no prospective purchaser or mortgagee of realty could complain of lack of notice. The question
thus becomes which burden it is most desirable to avoid-forcing
secured parties to file their security interests in fixtures in

several counties, or requiring that a check of the central filing
system in the Secretary of State's office be made for every real
estate transaction? With the problem phrased in this fashion,
perhaps the Committee was wise in limiting the central filing of
security interests in fixtures to a small class of debtors. However, if in the future the excepted class (now limited to "transmitting utilities") should be expanded so as to make it unclear
which classes of debtors will have security interests in their
fixtures filed centrally rather than locally, a notice problem
could be created and parties to realty transactions might be
2
forced to check the central filing system in every case.'
One other proposed change in filing rules for fixtures worthy
of mention is the proposed new subsection (6) of Section 9-402.
It allows a party with a security interest in fixtures to record the
mortgage of the real estate in lieu of filing a standard financing
statement if the content of the mortgage meets certain requirements. It should be emphasized that proposed Section 9-402 (6)
does not require that the mortgage be filed as a financing statement nor, apparently, that it be indexed with financing statements, but rather that recording of the mortgage is effective as
a filed financing statement. 13
12. The fact that the draftsmen of Article 9 have refused to provide a uniform definition of '"ixtures" and instead refer to state law
definitions also weighs in favor of a central filing location for security
interests in fixtures. The problem is most acute in multi-state transactions where it is often quite difficult to determine whether any given
collateral is or is not a fixture. For example, the Digit Corporation
sells the Acme Company four computers which are installed in four
Acme buildings in four different states. The computers might very well
be fixtures in some of the states but personalty in others. If Digit is
in error in its classification of the collateral under state law as either a
fixture or a non-fixture, it may well file in the wrong office, which
could invalidate its security interest. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Box
Corp., 249 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.J. 1966). This harsh result has been avoided
by cautious secured parties by filing for both fixtures and personalty
where there is any doubt. However, the draftsmen have created
several serious pitfalls for less cautious secured parties by (1) allowing
the definition of fixtures to turn on state law, which is often metaphysical and always non-uniform, and (2) by requiring a different filing location for fixtures than for other collateral, with filing in the wrong
office resulting in an unperfected and therefore extremely vulnerable
security interest.
13. FmNAL REPonT, supra note 3, § 9-402 (6) reads:
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B. DURATION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCING STATEMENTS
Under the current version of Section 9-403 (2) a properly filed
financing statement remains effective for five years unless it
states an earlier expiration date. Because of this factor most attorneys advise secured party clients not to state a maturity date.

Stating a maturity date is undesirable from the secured party's
point of view because he would prefer the security interest to
remain perfected at least a few months beyond the scheduled
maturity of the underlying obligation in case the debtor is delinquent.
The Committee proposes to amend Section 9-403(2) so as to

make all financing statements effective for five years with the
If (a) goods are or are to become fixtures related to the
real estate described in a mortgage of the real estate, (b) the
goods are described in the mortgage by item or type, (c) the
mortgage complies with the requirements for a financing statement in this section, and (d) the mortgage is duly recorded,
the mortgage is effective from the date of recording as a
financing statement filed as a fixture filing. No fee with reference to the financing statement is required other than the
regular recording and satisfaction fees with respect to the mortgage.
Two basic changes in the general filing rules were necessary to make
the mortgage alternative possible. First, the requirement that the secured party sign the financing statement is eliminated. FINAL REPoUT,
supra note 3, § 9-402(l). This formality served no purpose. Second,
an exception to the general rule of proposed Section 9-403(2), that a
financing statement is effective for five years, is made for mortgages
effective as fixture financing statements. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3,
§ 9-403 (6). Professor Homer Kripke, Associate Reporter of the Review
Committee, explains his view of these adjustments as follows:
We have facilitated the possibility of using a real estate mortgage as a fixture financing statement. It took two basic changes
in the filing rules to make that possible. The real estate mortgage, when used as a financing statement was not suitable to
this five-year continuation requirement, for many real estate
parties are not used to it. We, therefore, provide that when
the real estate mortgage is used as a financing statement, its
effectiveness is good so long as it is effective as a real estate
mortgage.
The other point was that real estate mortgages are customarily signed only by the mortgagor, not by the mortgagee.
If we set out to authorize the use of a real estate mortgage as
a financing statement, many parties would have a defective filing because the mortgagee had omitted to sign.
So for this reason primarily, but also for the reason that
no pre-Code practice contemplated that the secured party would
sign a security agreement, and the Code requirement that the
secured party sign the financing statement had resulted in
faulty filings in some cases because it was foreign to people's
practice-we have provided that hereafter a financing statement
need be signed only by the debtor, not by the secured person.
A Look at the Work of the Article 9 Review Committee-A Panel Discussion, 26 THE BusnmEss LAWYrE 307, 311 (1970).

1971]

AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 9

only exceptions being mortgages filed for security interests in
fixtures' 4 and security interests in the collateral of a "transmitting utility."' 5 The Committee rejects, with the two previously
stated exceptions, the frequent suggestion that a financing statemen should be effective for the duration of the underlying transaction and that the present requirement of filing a continuation
statement where the underlying transaction exceeds five years is
an unnecessary burden upon secured parties. It does this on the
ground that a uniform five year period of effectiveness promotes
ease of administration and handling of the financing statements."6
Perhaps this rejected suggestion deserves more consideration,
particularly in view of the fact that a security interest becomes
unperfected when the effectiveness of the financing statement
expires unless a continuation statement has been filed." The
Committee's argument that a filing officer who arranges his filings by years can clear the filings of any year automatically after
five years loses its force when it is recognized that all financing
statements are indexed alphabetically under the names of the
debtors rather than in the chronological order in which they were
filed.'8 If all financing statements were allowed to state their
own durations, the fact that some would exceed five years would
pose no more administrative problems in regard to clearing expired statements than does the current system of allowing some
filings to state durations of less than five years.10 Since all the
14. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. The proposed revision of Section 9-403 would make real estate mortgages filed to perfect
security interests in fixtures under proposed Section 9-402(6) effective
until the mortgage is released or satisfied of record or its effectiveness
otherwise terminates as to the real estate.
15. Financing statements covering the collateral of transmitting
utilities would be effective until a termination statement is filed. FmAL
REPORT, supra note 3, at § 9-403 (6).
16. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 243-44.

17. See text accompanying notes 20-23 inrfra.
18. In fact, both the current version and the proposed amended
version of Section 9-403(4) require that the financing statements be
indexed according to the names of the debtors. The Committee's remark that "searchers would have to go back to the effective date of the
Code if there could be valid long-term filings" (PRtnnmmNARY DRAFT
No. 2, supra note 2, at 49) is a misconception of how the filing system
actually works in practice. All a searcher need do is look up the
debtor in the alphabetical filing index in order to locate all effective
financing statements filed against that debtor regardless of the time
filed.
19. The Committee's statement that under the present filing provisions the files are "self-clearing" because of "uniform" five year durations, except for continued financing statements and those stating
shorter durations, (PRELIlmARY DRAFT No. 2, supra note 2, at 49) is an
illusion probably not shared by many filing officers.
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statements filed in the same year are not indexed together, but
rather are indexed alphabetically by debtors' names, the filing
officer must necessarily use a good deal of effort in clearing expired statements even if they have uniform five year durations.
If the only policy underlying limiting the durations of filings to
five years is the consideration of administrative ease, which is illusory, then longer durations should be allowed, particularly in
view of the consequences of a lapsed financing statement.
C.

CONSEQUENCES OF LAPSED FINANCING

STATEMENTS

As noted previously, the present version of Section 9-403(2),
as well as the proposed version, with two minor exceptions, prohibits a financing statement from being effective for longer than
five years. Since some transactions underlying security interests
require longer payment obligations and because some security
interests are intended to be open ended lines of secured credit
containing future advance clauses, secured parties often have to
file continuation statements under Section 9-403 (3) to retain perfected status beyond five years.
The Committee's proposed version of Section 9-403 (2) retains
the rule of the present version which provides that the effectiveness of a financing statement lapses upon its maturity date unless a continuation statement is filed in accordance with subsection (3) of that section, and like the current version, the proposed version also provides that the security interest becomes
unperfected upon a lapse. 20 However, the Committee does not
believe the present versions of the relevant Code sections make
explicit the consequences of loss of perfection due to lapse of the
effectiveness of a financing statement. In this respect it is
presently provided in Comment 3 to Section 9-403 that when a
security interest becomes unperfected due to the lapse of a filing
the interest of the secured party is subject to defeat by those
persons who take priority over an unperfected security interest

(see Section 9-301), and under Section 9-312(5) the holder of a

perfected conflicting security interest is such a person even
though before the lapse the conflicting interest was junior.

The Committee ratifies the results dictated by Comment 3 and
"proposes in Sections 9-103 (3) and 9-403 (2) to make clear that

20. However, the proposed version of Section 9-403(2), unlike the
present version, provides that lapse of the financing statement does not
result in unperfection where the security interest is one that can be
perfected without filing. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at § 9-403(2).
UCC § 9-302(1) lists the security interests which may be perfected
without filing.
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after the lapse all formerly junior security interests have priority
'21
over the lapsed security interest."
A final amendment to subsection (2) of Section 9-403 provides
that a financing statement does not lapse during a bankruptcy
or other insolvency proceeding. A security interest perfected by
filing which exists at the time insolvency proceedings are commenced by or against the debtor will remain perfected for a period of 60 days after the termination of the insolvency proceedings or until expiration of the five year period, whichever occurs
later. The apparent intended effect of this change is that the
bankruptcy trustee will not be able to defeat security interests
whose financing statements lapse during proceedings under Section 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act 22 on the grounds that the security interest is voidable by some actual creditor of the debtor
due to expiration of the financing statement after commencement
of the bankruptcy proceeding. However, it is an elementary rule
of bankruptcy law that the filing of a bankruptcy petition by or
against a debtor operates as a freeze upon priorities as they exist
on the date of filing.
No case has been found holding that a security interest perfected at the time a bankruptcy petition is filed is defeated by
either the trustee or a junior secured creditor if the perfection
lapses during the bankruptcy proceeding, and thus the Committee's provision in subsection (2) of proposed Section 9-403 that a
financing statement does not lapse during a bankruptcy or other
insolvency proceeding is based either on the incorrect assumption
that a security interest which lapses after a bankruptcy petition
21. PRELnVnNARY DRAFT No. 2, supra note 2, at 50. This decision is
reflected in the FmNA REPORT, supra note 3, at 244-45, where the words
"purchasers-i.e., buyers and secured parties" are substituted for "all
formerly junior security interests." UCC § 9-103(3) deals with loss of
perfection due to failure of the secured party to file a financing statement in a state to which collateral has been moved after the security
interest has been perfected in another state. A secured party has a
four month grace period following the movement of the collateral in
which to file in the second state. Failure to do so results in a lapse of
perfection. For a discussion of the Committee's proposed revision of
section 9-103, see text accompanying notes 36-75 infra. It should be
noted that on October 16, 1970, Mr. Justice Braucher of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, formerly Professor at the Harvard Law
School and Reporter for the Review Committee, distributed a revised
version of UCC § 9-103 [hereinafter cited as Braucher Draft]. This
version presumably superseded the version printed in PRELmIINARY
DRAFT No. 2, supra note 2. For the text of this revision, see note 36
infra. Justice Braucher's draft was, in turn, superseded by the draft
contained in the FINAL REPoRT, supra note 3.
22. 11U.S.C. § 110(e) (1971).
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has been filed is vulnerable, or on the belief that perhaps such
vulnerability may occur under the insolvency proceedings of
some states. If it is assumed that such a security interest is vulnerable upon a lapse of perfection after either a bankruptcy or
state insolvency petition has been filed, the Committee's proposal
to save the priority of the senior secured party in such circumstances seems inconsistent with the present rule of Section 9-403
(which the Committee explicitly approves and retains) that
senior secured parties whose financing statements lapse become
subordinate to the perfected security interests of juniors.1'
Preservation of the senior's priority in spite of the expiration
of his financing statement is acutely important in the bankruptcy
or insolvency situation because the secured party with priority
will be able to look to the collateral for satisfaction of the debtor's
obligation to him, whereas a junior secured party in most instances will end up as a general creditor and will be extremely
fortunate to get 10 per cent of his claim from the pro rata distribution of the debtor's estate. It would seem therefore that the
Committee's proposal to limit the effectiveness of financing statements to five years and to grant priority (except in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings) to perfected juniors over seniors
whose filings have lapsed is pure folly. First, the Committee's
reason for limiting the effectiveness of financing statements to
five years-i.e., ease of administration-is an illusion. Second,
even if the limited duration of effectiveness did result in easier
administration, does attainment of this goal justify the harsh
consequences of loss of the senior's priority upon lapse? Finally,
if there is some other policy reason behind giving perfected juniors priority over seniors who have become unperfected because
of lapsed filings, why should this policy be abandoned in the
bankruptcy-insolvency context where it is probably most important to juniors?
D.

TRANSFER OF COLLATERAL, DEBTOR'S CHANGE OF NAME, AND

PROPER NAME UNDER WHICH TO FILE

One question left unanswered by present filing provisions is
whether a secured party is under a duty to refile where he knows
of or has consented to the debtor's transfer of the collateral. Proposed Section 9-402 (7) provides that "a filed financing statement
remains effective with respect to collateral transferred by the
debtor even though the secured party knows of or consents to the
23.

See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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transfer" and does not require a refiling where the debtor transfers collateral.
The main virtue of such a rule is that it eliminates the burden
of policing collateral, which in most instances is impractical. Its
major vice is that where Smith purchases collateral from Jones
which is subject to the security interest of Factor, a lendor who
searches the recorded financing statements will find no filing
against Jones covering this property and may be misled into
extending credit upon encumbered collateral.
This problem is somewhat minimized by the fact that both
the present and proposed versions of Section 9-306 (2) provide that
where the secured party authorizes his debtor to sell the collateral the buyer takes free of the security interest; the secured
party loses his security interest in the collateral and instead gains
a security interest in the identifiable proceeds of the sale. Thus if
Jones was authorized by Factor to sell to Smith, neither Smith,
a subsequent creditor of Smith's taking a security interst in the
collateral after the sale, a purchaser from Smith nor a levying
creditor of Smith need fear pre-sale security interests created by
Jones. It seems anomalous that proposed Section 9-402(7) provides that a security interest remains effective without refiling
even though the secured party "consents" to the transfer of the
collateral, while Section 9-306(2) provides that a secured party
who "authorizes" his debtor to sell the collateral loses his security
interest. It must be noted, however, that except in the case of
inventory transactions, most secured parties explicitly prohibit
their debtors from selling collateral until the underlying obligation is satisfied. The problem is minimized still further in most
instances of unauthorized sales of collateral because Sections
9-307 through 9-309 provide that generally the purchaser takes
free of security interests created by his seller, even if the sale was
unauthorized, so long as the purchaser buys in the ordinary course
of business and does not have actual knowledge that the sale 2is4
in violation of the terms of his transferor's security agreement.
24. UCC § 9-307, Comment 2, points out that the definition of

"buyer in ordinary course" contained in UCC § 1-209(9) limits the ap-

plication of UCC § 9-307(1) to inventory. UCC § 9-301(2) extends
some protection to buyers of consumer goods and farm equipment
as to security interests created by their sellers. UCC § 9-308 protects persons who purchase chattel paper or nonnegotiable instruments
in the ordinary course of their own business. UCC § 9-309 protects
holders in due course (by due negotiation) and bona fide purchases of
negotiable instruments and documents of title. The only purchaser
granted no protection as to security interests created by his seller is a
purchaser of equipment.
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With the exception of security interests in equipment, in actual practice a secured party generally would be rather naive to
believe that his security interest in the collateral would be likely
to survive a sale by his debtor, irrespective of authorization.2
Since refiling in the event of a sale of the collateral by the debtor
is unlikely to provide retention of priority for the secured party
and since the subsequent security interest of a creditor of the
purchaser is unlikely to be subject to security interests created
by the purchaser's transferor, there would be little to be gained
by forcing secured parties to refile where their debtors sell collateral. The only person likely to be harmed by this rule is a secured creditor of equipment which was subject to a prior security
interest created by the debtor's transferor. Perhaps it would be
wise and fair to require only secured parties with security interests in equipment to refile under the name of a party who purchases the equipment from the secured party's original debtor.
A refiling problem similar to that where the debtor transfers
the collateral arises when the debtor changes his name. The
Committee's solution is found in proposed section 9-402 (7):
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organization its name, identity or corporate structure that a filed
financing statement becomes seriously misleading, the filing is
not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired
by the debtor more than four months after the change, unless a
new appropriate financing statement is filed before the expiration of that time.
Changes of debtors' names create notice problems because
security interests in the property of the debtor acquired before
the change of name will be filed under the debtor's previous
name. Potential creditors might thereby be misled into extending credit on the basis of a debtor's assets already subject to
a security interest filed under a previous name. Proposed Section 9-402 (7) does nothing to remedy the situation where collateral is acquired by the debtor prior to four months after its
change of name. For example, assume that as of January 1 all
of the personal property of the Ace Company is subject to security
interests. On January 2, Ace changes its name to the Zanzibar
Corporation. Subsequent searchers will find filed under the
name Zanzibar only security interests in property acquired by
it after April. Under this rule potential creditors must check
for filings under all previous names of a debtor. Whether this
25. See, e.g., Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental System, 3
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 962 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966). Cf. 0. M. Scott Credit
Corp. v. Apax, Inc., 97 R.I. 442, 198 A.2d 673 (1964).
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is preferable to requiring existing secured parties to file a namechanging financing statement as to all collateral regardless of the
debtor's date of acquisition depends upon whether the question
is viewed from the position of existing secured parties or of
potential creditors. In most instances, existing secured parties
are, through their continual dealings with their debtors, in a
better position to find out if a debtor has changed its name.
Another filing ambiguity the Committee hopes to resolve is
the problem arising where the debtor is a partnership or an individual using a trade name. The Committee proposes in its
version of Section 9-402(7) that a filing be made against a partnership in the name by which it is known and against an individual by his individual name. Neither the names of partners nor a trade name for individuals or partnerships need be
shown.2
Thus, the use of trade names would not be either required or prohibited. This hardly appears to solve the confusion
caused by the use of trade names.
III. DEFAULT PROVISIONS
The Committee has proposed some rather specific amendments to Part 5 of Article 9,27 which deals with the remedies and
duties of the debtor and secured party upon default. The Code
does not define "default," but rather leaves that problem to the
security agreement. Hence, the provisions of Part 5 do not come
into play until after a default, as defined by the security agreement, has occurred.
Section 9-501 (1) provides the secured party with three sets
of cumulative remedies upon default: (1) those granted in the
provisions of the Code [hereinafter "code remedies"]; (2) any
foreclosure procedures available under state non-code law [hereinafter "non-code remedies"]; and (3) those created by the security agreement [hereinafter "agreement remedies"]. Section 9501(3) limits the power of the parties to alter or waive certain of
the secured party's duties and the debtor's rights upon default
provided by the Code provisions in Article 9, Part 5, and thereby
places limitations upon agreement remedies. The alternative
26. Y'AL REPORT, supra note 3, at 245. Proposed Section 9-402 (7)
reads as follows:
A financing statement sufficiently shows the name of the debtor
if it gives his individual or partnership or corporate name,
whether or not it adds other trade names or the names of
partners.

27. UCC §§ 9-501 to 9-507.
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code remedies granted the secured party by Part 5 of Article 9
are to repossess the collateral 28 and either keep it in satisfaction
of the outstanding debt under Section 9-505(2) or to dispose of
the collateral (either on the debtor's premises or elsewhere) in
accordance with the rules of Section 9-504.29
As presently constituted, Section 9-505 (2) requires a secured
party intending to keep the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation to notify in writing the debtor, any other parties having
security interests in the collateral who have properly filed financing statements under the debtor's name, and any other persons known by the secured party to have security interests in
the collateral. 30 If he receives a written objection to this proposal within 30 days after the receipt of notification by any of the
notified parties, or if any other secured party objects in writing
within 30 days after the secured party obtained possession of the
collateral, the secured party in possession must dispose of the
collateral pursuant to Section 9-504. The obvious purpose of the
notice and objection procedures of Section 9-502 (2) is to allow
junior secured parties (as well as debtors) to object to the
senior secured party's retention where the value of the collateral
exceeds the amount of the senior's claim against the debtor. The
present provision gives both the debtor and junior secured
28. UCC § 9-503 allows the secured party to take possession of the
collateral upon default "unless otherwise agreed". This may be done
without judicial process, but only if it can be accomplished without a
"breach of the peace". Some courts have interpreted this phrase
broadly, requiring the secured party to use the judicial process to repossess collateral whenever the defaulting debtor objects to a private
repossession. See Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 7 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 131 (1970); Stone Machinery Co. v. Kessler, 1 Wash. App.

750, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 135 (1970). But cf. Harris Truck & Trailer
Sales v. Foote, 436 S.W.2d 460 (Tenn. App. 1968). A secured party
in possession after default, whether by judicial process or voluntary

surrender of the collateral, must abide by UCC § 9-207 with regard to

care and custody of the
29. UCC § 9-502
right to "take control
Section 9-306," and if

collateral.
also gives the secured party, upon default, the
of any proceeds to which he is entitled under
the secured party has a security interest in the

debtor's accounts, chattel paper, contract rights or general intangibles

he may collect them up to the amount of the outstanding indebtedness
with any surplus required to go to the debtor. The debtor is also liable
for any deficiency unless otherwise agreed. It should also be noted that
UCC § 9-501(3) (a) prohibits the debtor from waiving his rights to sur-

plus proceeds resulting from the collection of accounts under UCC

§ 9-502 or a disposition of collateral under UCC § 9-504.

30. Where the collateral is consumer goods a secured party intending either to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt or
sell it need notify only the debtor and not junior secured parties. See
UCC §§ 9-504 (3), 9-505(1).
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parties effective procedures to prevent a senior secured party

from pocketing any amount by which the value of the collateral
exceeds his claim.

The Committee has proposed amending Section 9-505(2) to
reduce the waiting period from 30 to 21 days and to have that
period commence from the day the secured party in possession
sends notice rather than the day notice is received, thereby elimi-

nating the uncertainty as to when parties actually received notification and when the waiting period begins to run. Both of
these amendments make good sense in view of the general purpose of Section 9-505(2) to encourage the satisfaction of obligations and thereby eliminate the deficiencies which so often result

from dispositions of collateral. A 21 day waiting period commencing from the date notice is sent probably makes the reten-

tion-satisfaction remedy of Section 9-505(2) more attractive to secured parties by eliminating uncertainty as to when the waiting
period begins and ends and by shortening the waiting period.
The Committee also proposes to amend Sections 9-501(3) and
9-505 (2) to allow the debtor to waive in writing, after (but not before) default, his right to notice of the intention of the secured
party in possession to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the
obligation under Section 9-505(2). This makes good sense in the
case of most defaulting commercial debtors who should be competent to waive the notice if they acquiesce in the secured party's
proposal. However, it is questionable whether consumer debtors
as well should be allowed to waive notice of the secured party's
proposal to retain the collateral. Many consumers may not understand the waiver document and may sign it because the secured party is willing to forego the remaining obligation in favor
of retaining the collateral which the secured party probably believes is more valuable than the remaining obligation.
Problems are also created by the Committee's proposal to
amend Section 9-505(2) to shrink the class of persons entitled to
receive notice of the intention of the secured party in possession
to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation. It will be
recalled that the present version of Section 9-505(2) requires the
secured party in possession to give written notice of his intention
to the debtor and all secured parties having security interests in
the collateral who have properly filed financing statements or
who are known to the secured party in possession.3 1 Under the
Committee's proposed amendment to Section 9-505 (2) the secured
31. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
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party in possession need notify only the debtor, if the debtor has
not waived such notice after default, and those parties who, in
writing, inform the secured party of their claimed interests in the
collateral before he has sent notice to the debtor or has secured
the debtor's waiver thereof. Thus under the proposed amendment the secured party in possession is not required to notify even
junior secured parties of record unless they manage to inform
him of their claimed interest in the collateral before he notifies
the debtor or secures a waiver of such notice. Only those junior
secured parties who beat this irrational time limit-i.e., one that
is set by the actions of the secured party in possession-will be
"entitled to notice" under the proposed version of Section 9-505
(2) and will thereby have power to object within the 21 day period. The fact that the Committee gives only those parties entitled to notice under its proposed version of Section 9-505 (2) the
power to object to retention of the collateral makes the attempt
by the Committee to reduce the class of persons entitled to notice
of a proposed retention devastating.
The Committee supports its reduced notice obligation by stating that the current requirement to notify all other secured parties on record or known to the secured party in possession
put[s] on the secured party [in possession] the necessity of
searching the record in every case and of keeping a record of
every telephone call by a person claiming an interest, and determining whether such a person is entitled to notice. In the
Committee's opinion, this burden is simply not justified in the
light of the few cases in which there will be junior security interests on file and even fewer cases in which
there will be an
equity for the junior party to be protected.3 2
It is questionable whether such cases are as unusual as the
Committee seems to believe. Where the debtor has little bargaining power at the time of the advance, the secured party often
takes a security interest in collateral far exceeding the amount of
the debt. Furthermore, with the common use of the after-acquired property clause the value of the collateral securing the
debt often increases considerably. Where the senior secured
party has substantially over-secured himself and has not covered
any future advances in the security agreement, subsequent creditors may very well make limited advances, taking junior security interests. This is particularly true where a subsequent creditor is unable to gain the priority status of a purchase money
33
security interest.
32. FINAL
33.

REPORT,

supra note 3, at 248.

See UCC §§ 9-107, 9-312(3) (4).
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Even if the Committee is correct in stating that junior security interests with equity in the collateral over and above the claim
of the senior secured party will be quite rare, it does not make
sense to allow the senior easily to deprive juniors of their right
to object to the senior's retention of the collateral. Juniors would
be left to the mercy of the debtor to protect them from the senior's
usurpation of the amount by which the value of the collateral exceeds the claim of the senior secured party. In attempting to
make the retention-satisfaction remedy of Section 9-505(2) more
attractive, the Committee has created an enticement for senior
secured parties to deal sharply with juniors where the collateral
is worth more than the obligation secured by the senior's security
interest. Even if the Committee is correct in claiming that the obligation currently placed upon senior secured parties to notify
unrecorded junior secured parties of which they have knowledge
is too great a burden, it would still seem an error not to require
seniors to notify juniors on record. Otherwise, juniors on record
must police the collateral, which is an absurd requirement in most
instances, particularly in view of the fact that the senior can
easily obtain the names of recorded juniors by checking the financing statements on file. Finally, even if the junior polices
the collateral this does not assure him of the right to notice and
therefore the opportunity to object to a senior's proposal to retain
the collateral unless he manages to inform the senior of his
claimed interest in the collateral prior to the senior's having notified the debtor or secured waiver of such notice from the debtor.
If proposed Section 9-505 (2) is not to provide an opportunity
for sharp dealing by unscrupulous seniors to the detriment of
juniors wherever the collateral is more valuable than the senior's
claim, it must require seniors to give notice of their intention to
retain the collateral to all recorded juniors, providing these juniors with a fair opportunity to object. At a minimum, it should
also give all-parties with security interests in the collateral standing to object to the proposed retention regardless of whether they
are entitled to notice of the retention under Section 9-505(2). A
senior should not be able to cut off a junior's right to notice and
standing to object merely by giving the debtor notice before the
junior is able to inform the senior of his claimed interest in the
collateral. If the proposed version of Section 9-505 (2) is enacted,
advances of credit under junior security interests will be too
hazardous to be extended unless a junior deprived of his right to
object is permitted to attack the retention on legal grounds outside of the Code after expiration of the waiting period. Such a
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collateral remedy, if open to juniors, would create more uncertainty about the retention-satisfaction remedy in the minds of seniors than presently exists under the current version of the statute.
In trying to strike a balance between encouraging the use of the
retention-satisfaction remedy of Section 9-505(2) and the protection of junior security interests in the collateral, the Committee
has proposed notice procedures that permit seniors to seriously
harm juniors unless their common debtor acts to protect the junior by refusing to waive notice and objecting after notice is received. The Committee's amendment would force juniors who
believe they have an equity beyond the claim of the senior secured party to police the collateral. The proposed notice amendment would strip juniors of their right to object to a senior's retention of the collateral where the senior so desires. It is debatable whether junior securied parties with equity in the collateral will be as uncommon as the Committee appears to assume.
Even if such juniors are rare, they deserve better protection of
their rights; if they do not receive better protection, secondary
lines of credit will become unavailable. It is unwise to treat juniors, however rare they might be, so shabbily, thereby discouraging the availability of secondary lines of credit merely to allow
seniors who propose to retain the collateral to avoid the simple
requirement of searching the financing statements filed under
the defaulting debtor's name and sending notice to holders of recorded junior security interests in the collateral.
The retention-satisfaction remedy could be made just as attractive to seniors without unduly jeopardizing the interests of
juniors if Section 9-505(2) were amended to read as follows:
In any other case involving consumer goods or any other collateral a secured party in possession may, after default, propose

to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation. Written
notice of such proposal shall be sent to the debtor, if he has not

signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying his

rights under this subsection, and to any other party who has a
security interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financ-

ing statement indexed in the name of the debtor in this state. In
the case of consumer goods no notice other than to the debtor
need be given. If the secured party in possession receives objection in writing from any person entitled to receive notification within 21 days after the notice was sent, or from any party
with an unrecorded security interest in the collateral within 21
days after the secured party took possession of the collateral,
the secured party in possession must dispose of the collateral
as required by Section 9-504. In the absence of such written objection the secured party may retain the collateral in satisfaction
of the debtor's obligation.
This proposal retains the advantages of allowing the secured
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party in possession to obtain the debtor's waiver of notice after
default (although, in the author's opinion, consumer debtors
should not be allowed to waive such notice) and cuts the waiting
period to 21 days, measured from the date notice is sent rather
than received. It also relieves the senior secured party of having
to determine which, if any, unrecorded secured parties are entitled to notification, thereby relieving him of the need to keep records of informal communications concerning the collateral. This
proposal would also protect the rights of recorded juniors to receive notice and object to the proposed retention in order to protect whatever equity they have in the collateral. Unrecorded
juniors, while not given the right to automatic notice, would still
have standing to object to the retention within 21 days after the
senior gained possession of the collateral. In most instances the
senior in possession could check the recorded financing statements
and mail appropriate notices in one day; if this is done on the
same day he repossesses the collateral a uniform 21 day waiting
period as against all parties with a right to object is created. A
senior who knows that the value of the collateral exceeds the
amount of his claim and who believes the defaulting debtor will
be indifferent to his proposal to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation will not, under the author's proposed version
of Section 9-505(2), be tempted to deprive juniors of notice of his
intention and the power to object and force a disposition of the
collateral. Juniors would not be forced to either police the collateral or fear sharp dealing by seniors that would deprive them
of their interest in the collateral. Potential juniors would not be
discouraged by the retention remedy from extending credit on the
basis of subordinate security interests.
The Committee has proposed amendments to Section 9-504(3)
-dealing with the sale or other disposition of collateral upon default-which are similar to those proposed for Section 9-505(2).
In its present form, Section 9-504(3), with exceptions, requires a
secured party seeking to sell or otherwise dispose of collateral to
give "reasonable notification" 34 of the time and place of any public sale or of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made to the debtor and, except in the
case of consumer goods, to all other secured parties having se34. UCC § 9-504, Comment 5, states:
"Reasonable notification" is not defined in this Article; at a
minimum it must be sent in such time that persons entitled to
receive it will have sufficient time to take part in the sale or
other disposition if they so desire.
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curity interests in the collateral who either have properly filed a
financing statement or who are known to the secured party.
The Committee proposes to allow debtors to waive notice of
sale after default. With the possible exception of consumer debtors this is reasonable. However, as it does with Section 9-505(2),
the Committee also proposes to require reasonable notice of sale
under Section 9-504 (3) only to those junior secured parties who
inform the senior of a claimed interest in the collateral prior to
the time the senior notifies the debtor or secures a waiver of notice from him. 35 This limitation upon the parties entitled to notice
allows senior secured parties to deprive juniors of notice at will.
This result, however, is less objectionable in a Section 9-504 (3)
sale than it is in the context of a Section 9-505 (2) retention because of the differing consequences for juniors and the different
purposes served by notice to them in the two instances. Where a
senior proposes to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debtor's obligation, notice to juniors is intended to provide an opportunity to object and force a sale, thereby preventing seniors from
pocketing a junior's claimed equity in the collateral. Retention by
a senior under Section 9-505 (2) destroys the security interests of
juniors in the collateral, allowing seniors to keep any amount by
which the value of the collateral exceeds their claims. Notice to
juniors serves a different purpose where the senior proposes to
sell or otherwise dispose of the collateral under Section 9-504.
Here notice allows a junior to attend the sale or other disposition
of the collateral, and Section 9-504(1) (c) assures him of receiving
any sale proceeds in excess of the senior's claim if he makes written demand before the proceeds are otherwise distributed.
If the Committee's version of Section 9-504 (3) is enacted, the
worst possible result would be that a senior aware of the excess
value of the collateral over his claim would deprive juniors of
their right to notice of sale by giving prompt notice to the debtor
or securing a waiver from the debtor before any juniors can qualify for notice. A senior who keeps the fact of default and sale
secret from juniors deprives them of their right to demand surplus proceeds under Section 9-504(1) (c). This problem is minimized by the fact that where the common debtor defaults on one
obligation secured by certain collateral it is possible that he will
also have defaulted on other obligations secured by the same collateral and knowledge of this should put juniors on guard as to
the whereabouts of the collateral. However, if these defaults on
35.

See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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several obligations secured by the same collateral are not simultaneous (e.g., the obligation to the senior secured party calls for
monthly payments while obligation to the junior requires semiannual payments), the junior probably will not discover the fact
of sale by the senior soon enough to make a demand for excess
proceeds under Section 9-504(1) (c). The wisdom of exposing
recorded juniors to the potential harm created by narrowing the
class entitled to notice under Section 9-504(3) is questionable
since its only apparent purpose is to relieve seniors of the slight
inconvenience of notifying recorded juniors of an intended sale
-a burden that is most logical under a "notice system" of recording the existence of security interests in personal property.
IV.

CONFLICT OF LAWS

To understand and evaluate the Committtee's conflict of laws
proposals, the present provisions will be outlined, the problems
created assessed, and the Committee's proposals considered to
determine whether they adequately deal with those problems.sc
36. As mentioned in note 21 supra, the Braucher Draft superseded
the version of Section 9-103 (dealing with conflict of laws) printed in
PRELnMIARY DRAFT

No. 2, supra note 2, and was superseded by the

version contained in the FiNAL REPORT, supra note 3. The only significant changes made in the final draft of Section 9-103 were in subsection
(1). Subsection (1) of the BraucherDraft read as follows:
(1) Documents, instrumentsand ordinary goods.
(a) This subsection applies to documents and instruments and to goods other than those covered by a certificate of title described in subsection (2), mobile goods described in subsection (3), and minerals described in subsection (5).
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, perfection and the effect of perfection or non-perfection of a

security interest in collateral are governed by the law
(including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction
where the collateral is when a conflicting claim arises.
(c) If the parties to a transaction creating a purchase

money security interest in goods in one jurisdiction understand at the time that the security interest attaches that
the goods will be kept in another jurisdiction, then the law

of the other jurisdiction governs the perfection and the
effect of perfection or non-perfection of the security interest from the time it attaches until ten days after the
debtor receives possession of the goods and thereafter if
the goods are taken to the other jurisdiction before the
end of the-ten day period.
(d) When collateral is brought into and kept in this state
while a security interest therein is perfected under the
law of the jurisdiction from which the collateral was removed,

(i) if action is required by Part 3 of this Article to
perfect the security interest and the action is not
taken before the expiration of the period of perfection
in the other jurisdiction or the end of four months af-
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In the context of multi-state secured transactions, the following are among the most important problems encompassed by the
term "conflict of laws": (1) the extent to which the parties to a
secured transaction within the scope of Article 9 are free to
select the law that will govern their transaction; (2) if a filing is
necessary to perfect a security interest, the state in which it
should be made; (3) which state's laws should determine the validity of the security interest; (4) which state's laws should determine if perfection has been accomplished; and (5) which state's
laws should determine the effect of perfection or nonperfection in
a controversy between the secured party and some third party
other than the debtor claiming an interest in the collateral?

A. FREEDOM OF THE PARTIES TO CHOOSE APPLICABLE LAW
Under the present versions of Sections 9-102 and 9-103 the
determination of which state's law will govern a secured transaction turns primarily upon the nature of the collateral. Section
9-102 provides that where the collateral is goods (other than "mobile goods," whose use normally involves interstate movement,
and personal property covered by a certificate of title), instruments, documents of title or chattel paper, the law of the state
where the collateral is located applies. 37 Section 9-103 provides
ter the collateral is brought into this state, whichever
period first expires, the security interest becomes unperfected at the end of that period and is deemed to
have been unperfected as against a person who became a purchaser after removal;
(ii) otherwise the security interest continues perfected for the same period as if the collateral had not
been removed;
(iii) for the purpose of priority over a buyer of consumer goods (subsection (2) of Section 9-307), the
period of the effectiveness of a filing in the jurisdiction from which the collateral is removed is governed
by the rules with respect to perfection in subparagraphs (i) and (ii).
While the Braucher Draft is now moot, it deserves discussion because
it is indicative of the Committee's thinking on what is perhaps the
most difficult and complex part of Article 9.
37. UCC § 9-102 fails to state explicitly which state's law applies
when the collateral has been located in different states at various times.
That is, the present provision leaves open the question-"located at
what time?" The possible choices would be the law of the state where
the collateral was located at the time of the signing of the security
agreement, at the time of the attachment of the security interest, at the
time of the perfection of the security interest or at the time a controversy arose as to rights in it.
Professor Gilmore, one of the principle drafters of the current provisions of Article 9, has stated that this silence in UCC § 9-102 "presumably .

.

. refers to the location of the collateral at the time the
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differing rules for determining the applicable law in the cases of
certain mobile goods and various intangibles which have no
"location" except perhaps in some metaphysical sense. These
38
rules will be discussed below.
Our present purpose is to examine the extent to which the
parties to a secured transaction under the present provisions of
Article 9 are free to select as applicable law that of some state
other than the one selected by either Section 9-102 or Section
9-103. Section 1-105 provides the basic choice of law rule for all
transactions within the scope of the Code. That Section provides
that the law of the forum state shall apply and govern the rights
and duties of the parties if the transaction has an "appropriate
relation" to the forum state. However, the section also gives the
parties to a Code transaction the power to agree that the law of
any state to which the transaction has a "reasonable relation"
shall apply. This power to select applicable law is limited, in
turn, by subsection (2) of Section 1-105 which provides that in
Article 9 transactions the law of the state selected by Section
9-102 and 9-103, whichever is applicable, shall govern and "a contrary agreement is effective only to the extent permitted" by
those sections.
In determining if the parties to a secured transaction have the
power to agree to select as applicable law that of some state other
than the one prescribed by Section 9-102 or Section 9-103, we
must ask what choice of law agreements would not be "contrary"
to those sections. Presumably any choice of law agreement not
"contrary" to those sections would not need to be explicitly permitted by them in order to be within the power of the parties to
adopt under Section 1-105. As to choice of law agreements that
are contrary to whichever section (9-102 or 9-103) is applicable,
it is necessary to ask whether they are permitted by the respective sections. Neither Section 9-102 nor Section 9-103 explicitly
permits any choice of law agreements, and it thus appears that
an agreement "contrary" to those sections would not be within
the power of the parties under Section 1-105. If the parties to a
secured transaction are to have any power under the present versions of the relevant Code provisions to select applicable law as
to any aspect of their transaction, it must therefore be through an
agreement which is not "contrary" to whichever of Sections 9-102
and 9-103 is applicable.
security interest attaches." 1 G. GILMORE SEcuRInY
PERsoNAL PRoPERTY 318 n.5 (1965).
38. See text accompanying notes 65-73 infra.
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Where the collateral is one of the tangible types subject to
Section 9-102 the parties apparently are powerless to choose the
law of any state other than the one prescribed by Section 9-102
as applicable to any aspect of the transaction governed by a provision of Article 9. This is because Section 9-102 provides that
for all tangible collateral (other than mobile goods and goods covered by a certificate of title) the Article 9 provisions of the
enacting state shall apply. An agreement by the parties that the
law of some other state should govern any issue subject to a provision of the Article 9 of the prescribed state would be "contrary"
to Section 9-102 and outside the power of the parties under Section 1-105. Hence, where the collateral is subject to Section
9-102, the parties are powerless to select the law of any state
other than that prescribed by Section 9-102 (i.e., the state where
the tangible collateral is located) as the governing law with
respect to any aspect of the secured transaction governed by an
Article 9 provision of the prescribed state regardless of whether
the state they would select has a "reasonable relationship" to the
transaction.39
In the case of intangible collateral, mobile goods or goods
covered by a certificate of title, subject to the choice of law provisions of Section 9-103, the power of the parties to select applicable law-at least as concerns some aspects of the secured transaction-is less clear. Unlike Section 9-102 which simply states
that the Article 9 provisions of the state it prescribes "shall apply," Section 9-103 provides that the law of the state it prescribes
shall govern the "validity" and "perfection" and "the possibility
and effect of proper filing." Recalling that Section 1-105 in effect
gives the parties to an Article 9 secured transaction the power to
select as applicable law that of any state having a "reasonable relationship" to the transaction so long as that selection agreement
is not "contrary" to either Section 9-102 or 9-103, whichever is
applicable, 40 it becomes strongly arguable that parties to a secured transaction involving Section 9-103 collateral have the
power to make choice of law agreements relating to aspects of
their transaction other than validity, perfection and the possibility
and effect of proper filing.41 For example, if Section 9-103 pre39. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 37, at 317. But see note 42 infra
and accompanying text.
40. See text following note 38 supra.
41. Apparently no court has passed on this specific issue. The
only related case appears to have correctly held, without extended
analysis, that UCC § 9-103 necessarily determines the law applicable
to all issues involving the validity and/or perfection of a security inter-
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scribed the law of Massachusetts as applicable to issues of
validity, perfection and filing, it appears that the parties could
agree that the law of New York (assuming the transaction has a
"reasonable relation" to New York) shall govern their rights upon
default. It is difficult to see how such an agreement would be
"contrary" to Section 9-103 since the parties' rights on default
cannot reasonably be said to be an issue of validity or perfection
of the security interest, nor does it bear upon the need or effect
of filing.
In summary, the present conflict of laws provisions of Section 9-102, when read in conjunction with present Section 1-105,
prohibit the parties to a secured transaction involving tangible
collateral subject to Section 9-102 from selecting the law of some
state other than that prescribed by Section 9-102 as the law governing any aspect of the transaction covered by a provision of
Article 9 as enacted in the prescribed state.42 The power of the
parties to select governing law where the collateral is subject to
Section 9-103 is unclear under the present versions of that Section and Section 1-105. 4 3 The leading treatise suggests that the
parties to such a transaction are powerless to agree upon the law
44
to govern any aspect of the transaction covered by Article 9.
est in a controversy between the secured party and some third party
(other than the debtor) claiming an interest in the collateral. Industrial Packaging Prods. Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging Int'l, Inc., 399 Pa. 643,
161 A.2d 19 (1960). The court thus left the parties powerless to agree
as to the law that will govern any issue covered by UCC § 9-103.
The court expressed no opinion as to whether the parties to a secured
transaction involving collateral subject to UCC § 9-103 have the power
to select applicable law regarding issues other than those enumerated
in UCC § 9-103.
Professor Gilmore reaches the broader and more questionable conclusion that UCC § 9-103, like UCC § 9-102, precludes the parties from
selecting applicable law on any issue governed by an Article 9 provision of the law of the state prescribed by UCC § 9-103. Professor
Gilmore arrives at this conclusion on the dubious assumption that the
terms "validity" and "perfection" as used in UCC § 9-103 together embrace all aspects of a secured transaction. 1 G. GILMoRE, supra note 37,
at 320-21.
42. See text accompanying note 39 supra. The only decided case
bearing upon this issue correctly held that the parties were free to
select the law to govern any aspect of a secured transaction involving
tangible collateral subject to UCC § 9-102 which was not governed by
an Article 9 provision of the state prescribed by that section. Thus the
parties choice of the law of a state other than that prescribed by UCC
§ 9-102 was followed by the court on the issue of usury since Article 9
has no usury provisions. Cooper v. Cherokee Village Dev. Co., Inc.,
236 Ark. 37, 364 S.W.2d 158 (1963).
43. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
44. See note 41 supra.
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However, since Section 9-103 by its own terms only prescribes
governing law for the purpose of judging the validity and perfection of the security interest as well as the need and effect of
filing, and since Section 1-105 gives the parties to an Article 9
transaction the power to make choice of law selections so long as
their selection is not "contrary" to Section 9-103, it is arguable
that they can select the law to govern aspects of the transaction
other than validity, perfection and the need and effect of filing
so long as the state whose law they select has a "reasonable relation" to the transaction.
In assessing the impact of the proposed Section 9-103 upon
the power of the parties to select governing law, the first noteworthy change is the Committee's deletion of the choice of law
language found in the present version of Section 9-102, leaving
that section to govern only scope issues (i.e., the types of transactions governed by Article 9), and transplantation of this choice
of law rule (for most tangible collateral) to Section 9-103, so
that only the latter section contains the choice of law provisions
of Article 9. Proposed Section 9-103 thus states choice of law
rules for all types of collateral within the scope of Article 9.
Our present concern is not with the particular states thereby
chosen for any given type of collateral, but rather the effect of
this proposal upon the power of the parties to select as applicable
the law of some state other than the one prescribed by Section
9-103.
As concerns tangible collateral now subject to the choice of
law provision of present Section 9-102, it will be recalled that under that section and the present version of Section 1-105 the parties to a secured transaction involving such collateral are not
allowed to select the law of any state other than the one prescribed by present Section 9-102 as the law applicable to any
aspect of their transaction which is covered by a provision of the
Article 9 of the prescribed state.4 5 The proposal appears to
create a new choice of law freedom for parties to secured transactions involving tangible collateral. Unlike the present version
of Section 9-102, which provides that the Article 9 provisions of
the law of the state it prescribes shall apply, the final draft of
Section 9-103 appears to make a more limited choice of law prescription by providing that the law of the state it prescribes as
applicable shall govern the issues of "perfection and the effect of
perfection or nonperfection of a security interest." When pro45.

See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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posed Section 9-103 is read in conjunction with Section 1-105 as
amended by the Committee, it appears that the parties to a
secured transaction involving tangible collateral are free to
select, as the law applicable to any issues other than "perfection
and the effect of perfection or nonperfection," the law of some
state other than the one prescribed by the final draft for that
type of collateral so long as the state selected bears a reasonable
relation to the transaction. Whereas under the present versions
of Sections 1-105 and 9-103, the parties to a secured transaction
involving collateral covered by present Section 9-103 are arguably
free to select the law applicable to any aspects of their transaction other than validity, perfection and the need and effect of
filing, under the final draft of Section 9-103 they will be free to
select governing law on all issues other than "perfection and the
effect of perfection or nonperfection."
The Committee's comments concerning Section 9-103 accompanying Preliminary Draft No. 246 and the Final Report 7 leave
it questionable whether the Committee appreciates the extent to
which it seems to have broadened the powers of the parties to
choose governing law. Considering what a major departure this
is, at least where tangible collateral is concerned, the Committee's comments are quite limited. In one statement concerning
changes in Section 1-105, the Committee states that
the general principles of [Section 1-105] should be applicable to
the choice of law problems within its scope [and] Section 9-103
continues to govern choice of law questions as to perfection of
security interests and the effect of perfection and nonperfection
thereof.48

In another comment the Committee states that the effect of limiting the Section 9-103 choice of law provision to issues of perfection of a security interest and the effect of perfection and nonperfection thereof "will be to have questions as to the creation
and validity of security interests determined according to the conflict of laws rules in Section 1-105."49 This must mean that the
parties have the power to agree to select applicable law regarding
issues other than those enumerated in proposed Section 9-103
so long as the state they select has a "reasonable relation" to the
transaction.

46. PREmmiARY DRAFT No. 2, supra note 2, at 35-41.
47. FnAL REPORT, supranote 3, at 26-33.
48. RmIw CommanrnT
FOR ARTcLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM CONMMcIAL CODE, PROPOSED FINAL REPORT Pt. 11, 1 (1971, unpublished) [hereinafter cited as PROPosED FiNAL REPORT].

49. FnTAL REPORT, supranote 3, at 230.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:117

Thus the Committee's approach to the problem of the power
of the parties to agree upon applicable law is to allow them to do
so when the issues will not affect the rights of third parties.50
Whether a security interest is perfected and the consequences of
perfection or nonperfection become important only where a controversy exists between the secured party and some third party
claiming an interest in the collateral.
There is no sound reason for prohibiting the parties to a secured transaction from selecting the law applicable to an aspect
of their transaction that will not affect the rights of third parties. To the extent that the present versions of Sections 1-105,
9-102 and 9-103 do so unnecessary restraints are placed upon the
parties. Similarly, there is no rational basis for the greater
choice of law freedom under present Section 9-103 than under
the present Section 9-102. All that is really necessary is that
third parties contemplating the extension of credit to a debtor
be able to independently determine which state's law will govern
perfection and its consequences for any given type of collateral so
that they may assess the risks of extending credit.5 1 If parties
entering into secured transactions take advantage of this increased freedom to select governing law, the key question under
proposed Section 9-103 as to the extent of their power to do
so will be which aspects of a secured transaction deal with
"perfection and the effect of perfection or nonperfection of a security interest" and are therefore beyond the power of the parties
to select the law to govern them.
One functional guideline that should be drawn here stems
50. This analysis seems to be substantiated by the Review Committee's comment:
Article 9 [as amended] does not govern problems of choice of
law between the original parties, and . . . this question is governed by the general choice of law provision in Section 1-105.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 25. If it was the Committee's intention
to allow the parties to select governing law only as to issues that do not
affect the rights of third parties, the Committee probably erred by
allowing the parties to select the law to govern the issue of the validity of the security interest. The power of the parties to select the law
to govern validity of the security interest could harm third parties only
if some state reasonably related to the transaction modifies its code
provisions dealing with validity so as to provide less stringent requirements for a valid security interest.
51. UCC § 1-105, Comment 5, explicitly cites this need as the reason for restrictions upon the choice of law prerogatives of the parties
to Article 9 secured transactions:
[P]arties taking a security interest or asked to extend credit
which may be subject to a security interest must have sure
ways to find out whether and where to file and where to look
for possible existing filings.
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from the previous observation that the concept of perfection
deals only with controversies between the secured party and
third parties claiming an interest in the collateral. Thus, in controversies involving only the secured party and the debtor, neither of them should be heard to argue that the choice of law
agreement they reached was barred by Section 9-103. 52 However, the rights of third parties should not be allowed to be limited by a choice of law agreement between the debtor and the secured party. This appears to be the aim of proposed Section
9-103 as it interacts with Section 1-105.

B. THE PLACE OF FILING AND THE LAW GOVERNING VALIDITY
One of the first and most important questions a secured
party must ask in connection with a multi-state secured transaction is: In which state must he file a financing statement, if filing
is required for perfection? One of the major reasons for the
complete redrafting of Section 9-103 by the Committee was the
failure of the present version of that section to give an explicit
answer to that question. 53 Yet, despite this avowed purpose, the
Committee has failed to provide an explicit answer in its proposed
Section 9-103. A secured party in the multi-state secured transaction would have received no help from Professor Braucher's proposed draft of Section 9-103 as to where he must file because the
general choice of law rule of the Braucher Draft provided in respect to most tangible collateral that, with exceptions,
perfection and the effect of perfection or nonperfection of a security interest in collateral are governed by the law (including
the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction where the collateral
is when a conflicting claim arises.54
52. The Committee supports this view in its comment regarding
the proposed changes in Sections 9-102 and 9-103. See note 50 supra.
The issue as to whether the parties should have the power to select
the law governing questions concerning the validity of the security interest is a tough one in that the Committee's criterion for determining
if the parties should have choice of law selection power (i.e., whether
the issue affects the rights of third parties) seems to cut against such
power in the case of validity issues, whereas the Committee's own proposals seem to grant such power to the parties. See text following
note 44 supra.
53. The Committee states:
[N]ow that the Code has been adopted in all states but Louisiana and also adopted in the District of Columbia and the
Virgin Islands, the emphasis in the revision [of Section 9-103)
has been to make clear where perfection of a security interest
must take place rather than on problems of actual conflicts of
rules of law.
FnAL BREsor, supra note 3, at 25.
54. See note 21 supra.
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As the author pointed out to the Committee before the Braucher
Draft was abandoned, surely this choice of law rule could not
mean that the jurisdiction where the collateral is located when a
conflicting claim arises is the jurisdiction in which to file because
the secured party would have no way of knowing where the collateral will be if and when such a claim arises.
The final draft of Section 9-103 (1) (b) provides a general conflict rule for documents, instruments and most types of goods:
[P]erfection and the effect of perfection or nonperfection of a
security interest in collateral are governed by the law of the
jurisdiction where the collateral is when the last event occurs
on which is based the assertion that the security interest is perfected or unperfected.
Like the Braucher Draft, the final draft of Section 9-103 fails to
explicitly state a rule as to where filings shall be made, leaving
it to assumption or inference that the law of the jurisdiction
whose law is prescribed by Section 9-103 as governing "perfection
and the effect of perfection or nonperfection" is also the proper
jurisdiction in which to file financing statements. There should
be no need for this assumption. The failure of the final draft of
proposed Section 9-103 to state an explicit rule as to the proper
jurisdiction for filing is unfortunate for at least three reasons:
(1) if a secured party in a multi-state secured transaction files in
the wrong jurisdiction it is likely that his security interest will be
unperfected; (2) potential creditors must be able to determine the
proper state in which filings are to be made so that they can check
for existing filings against the proposed collateral of a potential
debtor-if a potential creditor checks filings in the wrong state
he is likely to end up with a security interest subordinate to previous ones perfected by filings in the appropriate state; and (3)
the decisions as to where to file (or search for existing filings) are
usually made by lay credit managers rather than by attorneys.
These reasons demonstrate why Section 9-103 should state an explicit rule as to the proper jurisdiction for filing. Such a rule, for
each type of collateral, could be stated as follows:
For a security interest in [type of collateral], the appropriate
jurisdiction in which to file, if filing is required for perfection
is the jurisdiction where [whatever is appropriate for that type
of collateral].
A secured party in a multi-state secured transaction unable
to determine from the proposed final draft of Section 9-103 (1) (b)
where to file to perfect his security interest in one of the types of
collateral covered by subsection (1), will receive some help from
Comment 1 of proposed Section 9-103, which states that
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filing [is] required in the jurisdiction where the collateral is
when the last event [on which is based the assertion that the
security interest is perfected] occurs. 55
For those types of security interests where filing is required
for perfection there are five necessary elements or "events" for
perfection: (1) an agreement is reached between the debtor and
secured party that the security interest shall attach; (2) value is
given by the secured party; (3) the debtor obtains rights in the
collateral; 5 6 (4) a security agreement has been signed by the
debtor or the secured party has taken possession of the collateral; 57 and (5) a financing statement is filed.58 These five elements may occur in any order, and under the proposed final draft
of Section 9-103, as interpreted by proposed Comment 1, the secured party must file in the state where the collateral is located
at the time the last element is accomplished where the security
interest is in a type of collateral covered by proposed Section 9103(1). In the overwhelming majority of secured transactions
filing will be the final event and the secured party will simply
file in the state where the collateral is located at the time of filing.59 The law governing validity of the security interest under
the Committee's proposals will be selected under the normal
choice of law provisions of Section 1-105 with the parties having
the power to select as governing this issue the law of any state
having a "reasonable relation" to the transaction. 60
C.

THE LAW PREscRmED As GOVERNING PERFECTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES UNDER TH Braucher Draft m THE Final

Report
Present Section 9-102 provides the general choice of law rule
55. The Committee, like the drafters of the existing provisions of
the Code, has shown an unfortunate propensity to place important
substantive provisions which are not explicitly stated in the Code sections themselves in the official comments to the various sections. This
practice should be eliminated because none of the jurisdictions that
have enacted the Code have also enacted the comments, and the statute
books of such jurisdictions, which are often relied upon by busy attor-

neys not fully familiar with the Code, do not ordinarily include the
comments. Certainly the official comments are necessary and often
helpful, but they should not change the Code's substantive provisions or

add additional substantive rules not contained in the Code.
56. See UCC § 9-204 concerning the first three elements.
57. See UCC § 9-203.
58. See UCC §§ 9-302(1), 9-303, 9-304, 9-305.
59. See text accompanying notes 61-73 infra for proper filing procedure for security interests in collateral of types other than those
covered by proposed Section 9-103 (1).
60. See note 50 supraand accompanying text.
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(subject to the exceptions of present Section 9-103) that the law
of the state where the collateral is located shall apply. Obviously,
such a rule is unworkable for intangible types of collateral, and
Section 9-103 consequently dictates an exception to the general
rule for intangibles as well as for certain types of tangible collateral likely to be or actually moved interstate.61
The Braucher Draft of Section 9-103 retained this "state of
location" choice of law rule in subsection (1) for documents, instruments and "ordinary goods," but it provided that the prescribed state is the one where the collateral is located "when a
conflicting claim arises." The present version of Section 9-102,
on the other hand, fails to provide a time of location for its general choice of law rule.
Proposed Section 9-103 (1) (b) provides:
[P]erfection and the effect of perfection or non-perfection of a
security interest in [documents, instruments and ordinary goods]
are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral
is when the last event occurs on which is based the assertion that
the security interest is perfected or unperfected.
In view of the Committee's stated intention to prohibit the secured party and the debtor from making choice of law selections
that may be detrimental to third parties with conflicting interests
in the collateral, 6 2 this choice of law rule seems anomalous. It
appears to allow the secured party to delay any of the five steps
necessary for perfection when the collateral will be moving
through several jurisdictions and to effect the final step of perfection in a jurisdiction which may have non-uniform priority
rules favoring the secured party against the claims of various
third parties to the collateral. Admittedly, this criticism may
be overly technical in that it assumes the existence of non-uniform priority provisions in the code sections of adjoining jurisdictions and an effort on the part of secured parties to make
contrived movements of collateral not ordinarily made in the
course of typical secured transactions. However, for all practical purposes one who takes a security interest in ordinary
61. Article 9 presently has six classes of intangibles, three of

which-documents, instruments and chattel paper-are embodied in

pieces of paper and are sometimes referred to as "semi-intangibles".
These semi-intangibles are subject to the state of location choice of
law rule under UCC § 9-102 just as if they were fully tangible rather
than pieces of paper representing relationships and obligations. See
UCC § 9-103, Comment 2. The Committee proposes to eliminate the
term "contract rights" and reduce the number of classes of intangibles
to five.
62. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
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goods, documents or instruments not excepted from the general rule of proposed Section 9-103(1) (b) by either subsections
(1) (c) or (1) (d) of that section must keep track of the collateral
until the last of the five events necessary for perfection occurs,
and then either make sure that perfection is effective under the
law of the state where the collateral then is or suffer the consequences of non-perfection as prescribed by the law of that state.
The general choice of law rule of proposed Section 9-103(1)
appears to apply to all types of collateral deemed tangible
enough to be considered to have a location. There are, however,
some exceptions to this general rule for some types of collateral
even though they are "tangible" in that sense. One such exception is made in the case of goods covered by a certificate of title
issued under a statute requiring indication of a security interest
on the certificate as a condition of perfection.3 3 This exception is
carried over from the present version of Section 9-103 (4), which
provides that the perfection of a security interest in such collateral is governed by the law of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate. Proposed Section 9-103 (2) also provides that the perfection and effect of a security interest in such collateral is governed by the law of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate
until four months after the goods are removed from the jurisdiction and thereafter until the goods are registered in another jurisdiction, but not beyond the surrender of the certificate. And
it further provides that after the goods are moved interstate and
are either registered in another jurisdiction or the original certificate is surrendered (whichever first occurs) the goods become
subject to the general choice of law rule of proposed Section
9-103 (1) (i.e., the law of the state of location at the time the last
step of perfection was accomplished).
The major problems encountered under the present version
of Section 9-103(4), dealing with collateral subject to certificates
of title, involve the movement of such collateral between states
requiring a certificate of title and states not requiring a certificate. Proposed Section 9-103 provides, in effect, that a security
interest perfected by notation on a certificate of title will be
recognized without limit of duration but perfection will expire
if the certificate is surrendered. The Committee justifies this
result by stating that the secured party ordinarily holds the
certificate and surrender is unlikely to occur without his approval.64 Where collateral subject to a certificate of title in one
63. FnMA REPORT, supra note 3, at § 9-103 (2).
64. PROPosED FMNAL REPORT, supra note 48, at 18-19.
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state is moved to another state without surrender of the original
certificate and a certificate from the second state is also obtained,
a danger of deception of third parties is created. Proposed Section 9-103(2) (b) provides that in this situation the original
certificate ceases to remain operative and apparently perfection
and its consequences will thereafter be determined under Section 9-103(1) (d), which grants the secured party a four-month
grace period in which to perfect in the second state in order to
maintain continuous perfection. However, proposed Section
9-103 (2) (d) provides that if goods subject to a security interest
are brought into a state, regardless of how that security interest
was perfected in the previous state (i.e., by notification of a certificate of title or by normal filing of a financing statement), and
the state to which the goods were moved issues a certificate of
title for the goods which does not show that the goods are subject
to the security interest or may be subject to security interests not
shown on the certificate, the security interest is subordinate to
the rights of a buyer of the goods who is not in the business of
selling goods of that kind to the extent that he gives value and
receives delivery of the goods after issuance of the certificate and
without knowledge of the security interest.
Another exception to the general choice of law rule for tangible collateral is made in the case of certain mobile goods which
have no permanent location. This exception was originally stated
in the present version of Section 9-103(2) and is carried over in
substance in the proposed Section 9-103(3). That section has
also retained the definition of "mobile goods," which includes
those "normally used in more than one jurisdiction, such as
motor vehicles, trailers, rolling stock . . . and the like . .. .
The distinctive trait of these "mobile goods" is that their use
ordinarily involves interstate movement. They must be held as
equipment or inventory for lease to others to come within this
"mobile goods" exception. "Mobile goods" must be distinguished
from other types of goods that are normally used at any given
time in only one state but which happen to be moved interstate.0 5
65. The Braucher Draft, supra note 36, like the present version,
makes the mobile goods exception to the general choice of law rule for
tangibles expressly subordinated to the certificate of title exception so
that if mobile goods are subject to a certificate of title statute, the
choice of law rule for goods so subject will apply.
Another important point is the fact that mobile goods are defined
as those "normally" used in more than one jurisdiction. It is unimportant whether a particular debtor actually uses his mobile goods in
only one jurisdiction. If such goods are normally used in more than
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The present version of Section 9-103(2) provides that the appropriate state in which to file for a security interest in mobile
goods is the state where the debtor has his chief place of business
and that the law of that state shall govern the validity and perfection of the security interest. 60 Proposed Section 9-103 abandons the phrase "chief place of business" in favor of the "jurisdiction in which the debtor is located." Section 9-103 (3) (d) of
the final draft defines this new term as follows:
A debtor shall be deemed located at his place of business, if he
has one, at his chief executive office if he has more than one
place of business, otherwise at his residence.
The Committee does not explain the purpose of the change from
"chief place of business" to "the jurisdiction in which the debtor
is located." It does, however, state in the comments to the proposed version of Section 9-103 that, in the case of debtors with
multi-state operations, the prescribed state will ordinarily be the
one where its chief executive office is located and that
"Chief executive office" does not mean the place of incorporation; it means the place from which in fact the
debtor manages
the main part of this [sic] business operations. 67
Conspicuously absent from the present version of Section
one jurisdiction, the mobile goods choice of law rule applies rather
than the general choice of law rule for tangibles, and financing statements must be filed in the state prescribed by the former rule. See
UCC § 9-103, Comment 4.
66. UCC § 9-103, Comment 3, provides:
"[C]hief place of business" does not mean the place of incorporation; it means the place from which in fact the debtor
manages the main part of his business operations. That is the
place where persons dealing with the debtor would normally
look for credit information, and is the appropriate place for
filing. The term "chief place of business" is not defined in
this Section or elsewhere in this Act Doubt may arise as to
which is the "chief place of business" of a multi-state enterprise with decentralized, autonomous regional offices. A secured party in such a case may easily protect himself at no
great additional burden by filing in each of several places.
The same comment also provides that if the debtor's chief place of
business is moved from one state to another after a security interest
has been perfected in the state from which it has been moved, the secured party must refile in the state in which it has been relocated. But
the comment fails to provide either a grace or maximum period for such
refiling. Nor does it establish the consequences of a failure to refile in
such circumstances.
67. FiNA, REPoRT, supra note 3, at 30. The Committee goes on to
explain that
The term "chief executive office" is not defined in this Section
or elsewhere in this Act. Doubt may arise as to which is the
"chief executive office" of a multi-state enterprise, but it would
be rare that there could be more than two possibilities. A
secured party in such a case may easily protect himself at no
great additional burden by filing in each possible place.
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9-103 (2) is a rule concerning the consequences of the debtor moving its chief place of business from the state in which a filing was
made to another state. The present version of Section 9-103
leaves it to a comment to provide that refiling is required in the
event of the movement of the debtor's chief place of business
where a filing was made on the basis of its location.08 It also
fails to dictate timing requirements for such refilings as well as
the consequences of failing to refile under these circumstances.0
Proposed Section 9-103 (3) (e) fills this void by providing:
A security interest perfected under the law of the jurisdiction
of the location of the debtor is perfected until the expiration of
four months after a change of the debtor's location to another
jurisdiction, or until perfection would have ceased by the law of
the first jurisdiction, whichever period first expires. Unless
perfected in the new jurisdiction before the end of that period,
it becomes unperfected thereafter and is deemed to have been
unperfected as against a person who became a purchaser after
the change.
The Final Draft also creates a new exception to the general
choice of law rule for tangible collateral in the case of transactions creating purchase money security interests in goods where
the parties understand when the security interest attaches that
the collateral will be kept in another jurisdiction. Where such
an understanding is present, proposed Section 9-103 (1) (c) provides that the law of the jurisdiction to which the collateral
will be taken governs perfection and its consequences from the
time it attaches until 30 days after the debtor receives possession
of the goods and thereafter if the goods are taken to the other
jurisdiction before the end of the 30-day period. Thus where
X sells Y goods on credit, taking a purchase money security interest therein, and the goods are located in Nevada at the time of
the sale but it is understood at the time the security interest attaches that X will ship them to Y's Utah plant, X can file in Utah
to perfect his security interest before the goods are even sent
there. As long as the goods reach Utah within 30 days after the
debtor receives possession of them the effectiveness of X's filing
in that state continues without interruption. The Committee
states in its comments that if the collateral is not taken to the
second jurisdiction by the thirtieth day of the debtor's possession
the exception in Section 9-103(1) (c) ceases to be applicable and
thereafter "the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is
68.
69.

UCC § 9-103, Comment 3.
UCC § 9-103 (3) deals only with refiling upon the removal of

collateral (rather than offices) from one jurisdiction to another and ex-

pressly excepts mobile goods from its coverage.
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controls perfection." 70 This rather awkward exception to the
general rule is aimed at allowing the seller in a purchase money
security interest transaction to omit filing in the state where the
goods were located at the time the security interest attached
where it was understood at the time of attachment that the goods
would be located in another jurisdiction.
Proposed Section 9-103 adopts, in substance, the rule of
the present Section 9-103 requiring the secured party to refile
where tangible collateral is moved into one state from another
while a security interest is perfected under the law of the jurisdiction from which the collateral was removed. The secured
party is given a four month grace period in which to refile in the
second state and failure to do so creates a lapse of perfection as
against a person who became a purchaser after removal.
In the case of intangible collateral which cannot be said to
have a location, the present version of Section 9-103 provides
that the law governing the validity and perfection of a security
interest in accounts or contract rights and the possibility and
effect of filing is that of the jurisdiction in which the office
where the assignor-debtor keeps his records concerning such
accounts or contract rights is located. In the case of general
intangibles, the jurisdiction in which the debtor has his chief
place of business is the jurisdiction whose law will govern the
issues of validity, perfection and the possibility and effect of
filing.
The Committee has abolished the term "contract rights" and
incorporated that concept into the definition of "accounts" 7 1 and
has substituted as the governing law that of the state where the
assignor-debtor is located. 72 The change from the jurisdiction
where the assignor-debtor's office which keeps records concerning
70. FNAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 58. Secured parties contemplating purchase money secured transactions would do well to follow
the Committee's advice that
A failure of the collateral to reach the intended destination
jurisdiction before the expiration of the 30-day period because
of a conflicting claim or otherwise may cause disappointment of
expectations that the law of the destination jurisdiction will
govern continuously, and caution may dictate filing both in
that jurisdiction and in the jurisdiction where the security interest attaches.
FiNAL REPORT, supra note 3, at § 9-103, Comment 3.

71. See FnA.L REPORT, supra note 3, at § 9-106. Through an apparent oversight the Committee failed to delete the term "contract
rights" from Section 1-201(37).

72. The phrase "the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located" is
discussed in connection with the choice of law rule for mobile goods in
note 67 supra and accompanying text.
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the accounts to the jurisdiction where the debtor is located (usually its "chief executive office") was prompted by the fact that
most parties seeking to search for existing account filings are not
likely to know which of the assignor-debtor's offices keep records
with respect to its accounts and by the fact that, where the assignor-debtor does so at several locations, the filings for all its
various accounts subject to security interests would not be located
in the same jurisdiction.
The Committee has changed the governing jurisdiction in the
case of general intangibles from the jurisdiction where the debtor's chief place of business is located to the jurisdiction where the
debtor is located.7 3 Security interests in chattel papers are subject to present Section 9-102, which provides that the law of the
jurisdiction where the chattel paper is located shall govern all
issues within the scope of the Article 9 provision of that state.
The proposed version of Section 9-103 (4) provides that the perfection and consequences of perfection of a possessory security
interest in chattel paper shall be governed by the rule stated for
goods in Section 9-103 (1) (i.e., the law of the state where the
collateral was located when the last event necessary for perfection was performed), and that the choice of law rules provided
in Section 9-103 (3) for accounts shall apply to non-possessory
security interests in chattel paper (i.e., the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located governs perfection and its
consequences).
D. SumwAY
Proposed Section 9-103 appears to have significantly increased the power of the parties to an Article 9 secured transaction to select the law to govern most aspects of their transaction. The total redrafting of the section was aimed at making
the choice of law rules less complicated and more clear. It
does not seem that this goal has been accomplished. In fact,
if the Committee's purpose in redrafting Section 9-103 was, as it
professed, to create "certainty as to where to file in order to perfect security interests, '74 the revised version must be deemed a
73. Under proposed Section 9-103(3) (e), if the debtor moves his
location from one jurisdiction to another, a secured party who filed in
the original jurisdiction to perfect a security interest in either mobile
goods, accounts or general intangibles must refile in the second jurisdiction within four months after such movement or before his perfection
in the first jurisdiction would have lapsed, whichever period first expires.
74. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 230. See also note 47 supra.
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failure. The primary shortcoming of the proposed version of
Section 9-103 is that it fails to state explicitly in which jurisdiction
financing statements should be filed where they are required for
perfection in a multi-state transaction. One is left to infer that
the jurisdiction whose law is prescribed to govern issues of perfection and its consequences is also the jurisdiction in which to
file. Also, the general filing rule of Section 9-103 (1), applicable
to documents, instruments and most types of goods, is overly
complex and certain to cause confusion.
The conflicts provision of the final draft of Section 9-103,
concerning the proper jurisdiction in which to file in multi-state
secured transactions, should be changed to state a rule for every
type of collateral. For example, it might state:
The proper place to file, if filing is required for perfection, is the
jurisdiction where [whatever is appropriate for the type of collateral]. Perfection and the effect of perfection or non-perfection of a security interest in [the given type of collateral] shall
be governed by the law (including the conflict of laws rules)
of the jurisdiction where [whatever is appropriate for the type
of collateral].
Such a prototype would give secured parties and potential creditors a clear and explicit rule as to the proper state in which to
file (or check for existing filings) for each type of collateral controlled by Article 9. Because of the confusing fashion in which
the final draft states the general conflicts rule, its exceptions,
which generally aim at requiring the secured party to file in
some jurisdiction other than the one in which the collateral was
located at the time the final step needed for perfection was accomplished, are also unclear.
V.

QUESTIONS OF SCOPE

One aspect of Article 9 that has been substantially free of
serious problems is its scope (i.e., the types of transactions to
which it applies). The Committee has recommended only three
changes regarding the scope of Article 9.
Two of the recommended changes, those dealing with receipts issued by grain dealers and those dealing with railway
equipment trusts, will not be discussed. The third suggested
change concerns security interests in beneficial interests in trusts
and estates. The Committee comments that such beneficial interests
are typically not commercial collateral, and a requirement of
filing with respect thereto seems inappropriate and might act as
an entrapment of secured parties who would fail to analyze the
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collateral as a general intangible. It would be possible to exclude this kind of collateral from Article 9 by a provision in
Section 9-104, but the Committee recommends leaving this collateral subject to the general rules of security law provided by
Article 9 but with an exclusion from filing by a provision in
Section 9-302(1).75
This comment seems upon initial consideration to make good
sense. However, its embodiment in proposed Section 9-302(1) (c)
creates some unnecessary confusion by providing that "a security
interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a
trust or a decedent's estate" is perfected without the filing of a financing statement. The confusion stems from the fact that not
all assignments create security interests. Insofar as is here relevant, the term "security interest" is defined in present Section
1-201(37) to mean
an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation ....
The term also includes any interest of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper or contract rights which is subject to Article 9.
Where X is a beneficiary under a trust which pays him $100 per
month and is in need of a large sum of cash, he may assign his
right to receive the trust distributions to Y as consideration for
Y's agreement to pay him a certain amount in cash. In such an
assignment no security interest is created. Y's interest in the
trust distributions would not secure payment or performance of
an obligation nor would Y be a buyer of accounts, chattel paper
or contract rights. While a beneficiary may grant a security interest in his beneficial interest in a trust or estate to secure payment or performance of an obligation, not all assignments of such
interests will create security interests. Thus it would seem that
the reach of the Code in regard to such transactions could be more
clearly stated if proposed Section 9-302(1) (c) were to read "a security interest in a beneficial interest in a trust or a decedent's
76
estate."
While the author does not dispute the Committee's decision to
75. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 242.
76. It is worthy of note that UCC § 9-102 (1) (b) extends the scope
of Article 9 beyond UCC § 9-201(37)'s definition of "security interests"
by providing, with exceptions not here relevant, that "this Article applies ... to any sale of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper."
[emphasis added]. UCC § 9-102, Comment 2, explains this extension
of the scope of Article 9 as follows:
Commercial financing on the basis of accounts, contract rights
and chattel papers is often so conducted that the distinction
between a security transfer and a sale is blurred, and a sale of
such property is therefore covered by subsection (1) (b)
whether intended for security or not, unless excluded by Section 9-103 or Section 9-104.
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keep such security interests within the scope of Article 9, the
wisdom of allowing perfection without filing is questionable. The
present version of Section 9-302 requires the filing of a financing
statement to perfect a security interest in a general intangible.
Under present Section 9-301 (1) (d) a bona fide purchaser of a general intangible prevails over an unperfected security interest
therein (i.e., one for which a financing statement has not been
filed). The Committee's proposal to allow perfection of this type
of general intangible without the filing of a financing statement
will destroy the priority of a bona fide purchaser because the security interest will be automatically perfected without filing once
it attaches under Section 9-204. When there is no tangible document representing the general intangible subject to a security
interest (in this case, a beneficial interest in a trust or estate), allowing perfection without filing creates a trap for potential assignees of such interests because a search of the record will reveal
nothing and an assignor is therefore not effectively restricted
from making two assignments of the same beneficial interest.
The second assignee, while having no way of determining if the
assigned interest is encumbered, takes subject to any prior security interests. The Committee feels that the filing requirement in

this case "might operate to defeat many assignments" which are
"not ordinarily thought of [by secured parties] as subject to this
Article." 77 However, by removing the filing requirement the
Committee has created an entrapment for bona fide purchasers.
The author cannot agree with the Committee's apparent decision
that a bona fide purchaser, rather than the secured party, should
bear the burden of the secured party's failure to realize that the
transaction is within the scope of Article 9.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the four topics discussed herein are fairly representative
of the Committee's work, perhaps the Final Report should be returned to the drawing board for further consideration by the
Committee. In this age of controversial legislative issues the
author hopes that state legislators will overcome the understandable temptation to perfunctorily enact the proposed amendments
to a rather technical uniform act and will submit the Committee's proposed amendments to close scrutiny.

77. FIAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 84.

